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INTRODUCTION
In December 2016, the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
began using a new predictive policing tool called “Patternizr” to assist
investigators in recognizing potential crime patterns.1 The algorithm,
built on past crime data, is currently used to spot patterns of
robberies, burglaries, and grand larcenies that may have been
committed by the same person or group of people.2 The NYPD
shared news of this development in February 2019 with the
publication of an academic article by Patternizr’s developers, Alex
Chohlas-Wood, former Director of Analytics at the NYPD, and Evan
Levine, Assistant Commissioner of Data Analytics at the NYPD.3
Despite acknowledging the “growing concern that predictive policing
tools may perpetuate disparate impact,” Chohlas-Wood and Levine
explain how they designed Patternizr to minimize bias.4 They claim
to have accomplished this goal by blinding the models to “sensitive
suspect information” including race and gender, as well as “ke[eping]
potential proxy variables for sensitive information — particularly
location — extremely coarse” in order to avoid correlation of crime

1. Alex Chohlas-Wood & E. S. Levine, A Recommendation Engine to Aid in
Identifying Crime Patterns, 49 INFORMS J. ON APPLIED ANALYTICS 154 (2019).
2. Brian Holak, NYPD’s Patternizr Crime Analysis Tool Raises AI Bias
SEARCHBUSINESSANALYTICS.COM
(Mar.
14,
2019),
Concerns,

https://searchbusinessanalytics.techtarget.com/news/252459511/NYPDs-Patternizrcrime-analysis-tool-raises-AI-bias-concerns [https://perma.cc/B6KA-HD29] (quoting
NYPD spokesperson Devora Kaye).
3. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 160.
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patterns with “sensitive attributes.”5 They asserted that “Patternizr is
a new, effective, and fair recommendation engine . . . [that] when used
properly, encourage[s] precision policing approaches instead of
widespread, heavy-handed enforcement techniques.”6 This Article
considers whether the developers’ goal to build a bias-free predictive
policing tool is actually achievable given the limitations of its inputs
— racially-biased historic criminal justice data — and its users —
humans with the potential for errors and cognitive biases.
This Article further considers the problems that may arise as a
result of the NYPD’s use of Patternizr and attempts to evaluate
whether it is a “fair,” unbiased tool, as the NYPD and Patternizr
developers claimed. Moreover, this Article seeks to further evaluate
that claim based on the information disclosed in the Chohlas-Wood
and Levine paper. This Article identifies specific areas where more
information and independent review is needed to fully interrogate
this claim.
In order to evaluate Patternizr, Part I reviews the extensive
literature on the use of algorithms in the criminal legal system and
then draws from these insights to evaluate potential issues raised by
Patternizr. This Part also provides a brief background on predictive
policing, tracking its evolution from computer-generated “heat maps”
to increasingly sophisticated predictive models. Following this
background, Part I provides an overview of racial justice and civil
liberties issues raised by predictive policing in general.
Part II focuses on Patternizr, first providing background on its
development and the capabilities of the software. Part II then
considers whether and how Patternizr could be used in ways that run
afoul of the rights of those accused of crimes, specifically looking at
issues of potential for error and due process concerns, racial bias, and
Fourth Amendment rights.
Part III provides recommendations for advocates to help curb the
potential harms from this new predictive policing tool. It considers
potential policy solutions, ranging from an outright ban of predictive
policing algorithms to regulations that would increase transparency
and accountability in the use of predictive policing. Further, Part III
recommends methods for criminal defense attorneys to seek

5. Id. Chohlas-Wood and Levine give the example of race as a “sensitive suspect
attribute.” Id. at 157. They characterize characteristics such as height, weight, force
used, and number of suspects as “nonsensitive.” Id. at 158.
6. Id. at 163.
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disclosure of the use of Patternizr in criminal cases under New York’s
new discovery statute, set to go into effect in January 2020.
The Article does not focus on Patternizr’s potential efficacy of
reducing crime or identifying individuals suspected of committing
crimes. As such, traditional crime-solving efficacy measures are not
used to evaluate the algorithm. Instead, this Article focuses on how
the NYPD’s use of Patternizr raises serious civil rights and liberties
issues for those accused of crimes and how tools such as Patternizer
contribute to racially-biased mass incarceration and mass surveillance
of New York’s communities of color.
I. BACKGROUND ON PREDICTIVE POLICING
Predictive policing is an umbrella term that encompasses “the
application of analytical techniques . . . to identify likely targets for
police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crime” by making
statistical predictions.7 It is “based on directed, information-based
patrol; rapid response supported by fact-based prepositioning of
assets; and proactive, intelligence-based tactics, strategy, and policy.”8
Its proponents argue that predictive policing can revolutionize
policing, help cash-strapped departments do more with less, and
drastically increase public safety.9 Its critics, including academics and
leading criminal justice reform advocacy groups, caution that
“[p]redictive policing tools threaten to provide a misleading and
undeserved imprimatur of impartiality for an institution that
desperately needs fundamental change.”10 The following Section
traces a brief history of predictive policing followed by racial justice
and civil liberties concerns raised by the use of algorithms in the
criminal legal system.

7. Id. at 154 (quoting WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE
ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 1–2 (RAND
Corp. 2013)).
8. Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn
from Wal-Mart and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF
MAG. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/predictive-policing-whatcan-we-learn-from-wal-mart-and-amazon-about-fighting-crime-in-a-recession/
[https://perma.cc/D52N-3U36].
9. Id.
10. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS PRIVACY, RACIAL
JUSTICE & TECH. ORGS., PREDICTIVE POLICING TODAY: A SHARED STATEMENT OF
CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2016) [hereinafter ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS.],
https://www.aclu.org/other/statement-concern-about-predictive-policing-aclu-and-16civil-rights-privacy-racial-justice [https://perma.cc/A459-SZ7Z].
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A. A Short History of Predictive Policing
Professor Andrew G. Ferguson divides predictive policing
technology into three distinct generations.11 First, police departments
developed algorithms to predict the locations of property crimes.12
Second, this evolved into a focus on predicting the locations of violent
crimes, including robberies, shootings, and gang-related violence.13
The most recent evolution, noted by Ferguson, is a shift to predictive
policing tools that can forecast specific individuals who are predicted
to be involved in crimes either as perpetrators or victims.14 Professor
Ferguson cautions that each generation of predictive policing tools
“may be based on historical data with statistically significant
correlations, but the analyses and civil liberties concerns differ.”15
Although his generation model does not include a category into
which Patternizr can easily be characterized, as Patternizr neither
predicts locations nor people who may be involved with future crimes,
Ferguson’s approach of differentiating the various generations of
predictive policing tools and evaluating each for specific concerns
raised is important. For example, the concerns raised regarding
place-based policing programs differ from a new pattern-based tool
like Patternizr. However, it is important to understand concerns
about predictive policing more broadly in order to effectively analyze
this new generation of tools.
Ferguson and others note that the NYPD has long sought to
increase policing efficiency through the use of data and technology.16
In 1994, the NYPD developed Compstat — computer comparison
statistics — to “compile information on crimes, victims, times of day
crimes took place, and other details that enable precinct officials to
spot emerging crime patterns.”17 Following New York City’s lead,
other cities implemented various data-driven systems to better
allocate policing resources, often using a form of hotspot policing

11. Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1112–13, 1114, 1136 (2017) [hereinafter Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing].
12. Id. at 1144.
13. Id. at 1126–37.
14. Id. at 1137–43.
15. Id. at 1114.
16. Id. at 1124; Harvard Gov’t Innovators Network, Compstat: A Crime
Reduction Management Tool, INNOVATIONS IN AM. GOV. AWARDS (1996),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/compstat-crime-reduction-management-tool
[https://perma.cc/PLX9-ARLE].
17. Harvard Gov’t Innovators Network, supra note 16.
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where analysts plotted crime reports on a map and sent officers to the
areas where crime was most concentrated.18
Taking hotspot policing to the next level beyond Compstat, the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) collaborated with academics to
develop an algorithm to predict likely areas where property crimes
would occur.19 Starting in 2010, the LAPD used these predictions to
deploy officers to specific areas where crimes were anticipated in the
hopes of having a deterrent effect.20 In an influential article directed
at policing insiders, the LAPD Chief of Detectives and collaborating
data scientist urged the law enforcement community to adopt lessons
from business analytics and touted the success of the LAPD’s early
experiments with predictive policing.21
As advances in predictive policing gained national attention, the
academics who developed the algorithm that predicted areas where
crime was likely to occur formed PredPol, Inc., a company that sells
predictive policing software to law enforcement agencies across the
country.22 The early experiments in using algorithms to predict and
deter crime morphed into “a multi-million dollar business, and largescale marketing campaign to sell predictive policing programs.”23
Other companies, such as Palantir, HunchLabs, and IBM, also sell
technologies similar to PredPol’s software to help police departments
identify crime trends and forecast locations and offenders of future
crimes.24 Now that predictive policing is a profitable industry,
developers of new predictive policing technologies may have financial
incentives to trumpet claims of efficacy and fairness while competing
for lucrative government contracts. As will be discussed later in this
Article, these incentives raise the stakes for governing bodies and the
public to seek outside audits of predictive policing tools and not
simply take the assertions of fairness and efficacy from developers at
face value.25

18. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1126.
19. Id. at 1126–27.
20. Mark Puente, LAPD Pioneered Predicting Crime with Data. Many Police
L.A.
TIMES
(July
3,
2019),
Don’t
Think
It
Works,
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-precision-policing-data-20190703story.html [https://perma.cc/YT75-PB8W]; Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing,
supra note 11, at 1126–30.
21. Beck & McCue, supra note 8.
22. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1131.
23. Id. at 1132.
24. See Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE 15,
16 (2016).
25. See infra Section III.B.i.
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B. Critiques of Predictive Policing and “Actuarial Justice”
With the rise of the use of data and algorithms in many areas of
criminal procedure — including risk assessments for bail
determinations, sentencing, and parole determinations26 in addition
to predictive policing tools27 — researchers and reform advocates
alike have raised concerns about the transparency and fairness of the
algorithms upon which the criminal legal system increasingly relies.
These concerns center on issues of racial bias, automation and
confirmation bias, Fourth Amendment issues, data accuracy and due
process concerns, and democratic oversight of the use of these new
policing tools. This Section briefly outlines each of these concerns
and gathers insights from commentators and advocates about
suggested steps to evaluate predictive policing tools.

i. Racial Biases
The potential for racial biases to be built into algorithms used in
the criminal legal system has been the focus of much concern and
research by social scientists, legal scholars, and advocates.
Researchers point out that algorithms are prone to reproduce racial
biases in the data sets on which the algorithms are trained, even when
the data does not explicitly include race as a factor.28 One reason is
that police databases provide an incomplete and unrepresentative
picture of all crimes, likely due to implicit and explicit racial bias
informing areas where police patrol and who they stop, search, and
arrest.29 Professor Barry Friedman explains this dynamic:
Algorithms don’t have to look at race to be racist. Whether written
by humans or a product of machine learning, algorithms take past
facts and magnify them into future police actions. They rely heavily
on criminal records. Much of street policing in recent years — stop
and frisk, marijuana enforcement, catching fare-beaters — has been
deployed disproportionately against minorities and in poor
neighborhoods. Police may ‘go where the crime is,’ but because so

26. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/G5DN-7QGQ].
27. See infra Section II.A.
28. See, e.g., Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 17–18 (PredPol “has been described
by its founders as a parsimonious race-neutral system that uses ‘only three data
points in making predictions: past type of crime, place of crime and time of crime. It
uses no personal information about individuals or groups of individuals, eliminating
any personal liberties and profiling concerns.’”); see also Angwin et al., supra note
26.
29. Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 15–16.
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much focus has been on low-level offenses in disadvantaged areas
that are ignored elsewhere, these algorithms make it inevitable that
the police will return to these places time and again.30

Additionally, no one is immune from implicit bias. In addition to
officers’ biases, community members who report crimes also influence
historic crime data with bias.31 As a result of biases held by officers
and those reporting crimes, predictive policing algorithms are built
with an incomplete and biased understanding of where crimes are
taking place and who is committing them.
In two recent studies of different algorithms — NorthPointe’s
COMPAS risk assessment tool and PredPol’s location-based
predictive policing algorithm — social scientists found evidence of
racially disparate impacts despite both software programs’ claims that
the algorithms do not use race as a factor.32 In ProPublica’s report on
COMPAS, researchers reported that the algorithm-based tool for
assessing risk of reoffending for pretrial release, sentencing, and
parole decisions accurately predicted recidivism in the total pool 61%
of the time, but that “[B]lack [people] [were] almost twice as likely as
whites to be labeled a higher risk but not actually re-offend.”33 The
researchers also found that the assessment tool made “the opposite
mistake among whites” in that white people were more likely to be
labeled lower risk but go on to commit other crimes.34 The report
explains that COMPAS’s developers found it “difficult to construct a
score that doesn’t include items that can be correlated with race —
such as poverty, joblessness, and social marginalization” and that
omissions of such data reduces the accuracy of the predictions.35
Another algorithm — PredPol — is unable to correct the flaws in
the data produced as a result of racial bias. In a study published in
2016, Human Rights Data Analysis Group Lead Statistician Kristian

30. Barry Friedman, The Worrisome Future of Policing Technology, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/the-worrisome-futureof-policing-technology.html [https://perma.cc/5FG6-53JS].
31. Angwin et al., supra note 26; see also Jessica Gillooly, Opinion, Want to Stop
More Starbucks Scenarios? Train These People, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/911-dispatchers-sit-between-police-andpeople-of-color-they-need-better-training/2018/05/25/124b2bd6-5acf-11e8-858f12becb4d6067_story.html [https://perma.cc/64NR-G8F5].
32. Lum & Isaac, supra note 24; see also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY 86 (2016) (“Jeffrey Brantingham, the UCLA anthropology professor
who founded PredPol, stressed to me that the model is blind to race and ethnicity.”).
33. Angwin et al., supra note 26.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Lum and PhD candidate William Isaac compared PredPol
recommendations on enforcement areas, which were based on
historic drug crime data, with public health data on drug use in
Oakland, California.36 They built a synthetic population of Oakland
and mapped for drug use based on public health data, finding that
“[v]ariations in our estimated numbers of drug users are driven
primarily by differences in population density, as the estimated rate of
drug use is relatively uniform across the city.”37 However, the policerecorded data for drug crimes paints a very different picture, with
arrests focused in “two areas with largely non-white and low-income
populations.”38 To show the impact of using this police-recorded data
on the operation of a predictive policing model, Lum and Isaac
applied a publicly available PredPol algorithm to the Oakland Police
Department data on drug crimes, finding that the model flagged areas
“already over-represented in the historical policing data” (compared
to their drug use density map) for targeted enforcement.39 Since
PredPol cannot correct for racial bias, the resulting data only
intensifies that bias. Thus, the researchers concluded that the
algorithm reinforced racial biases in the original police data rather
than correct for such bias.40
Criminal law reform advocates echo similar concerns. Ezekiel
Edwards, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Criminal Law Reform Project, summarized the impact of racial biases
throughout the criminal system:
If there is one reliable prediction about our criminal justice system,
it is that unwarranted racial disparities infect every stage of the
criminal law process. Time and again, analysis of stops, frisks,
searches, arrests, pretrial detentions, convictions, and sentencing
reveal differential treatment of people of color. From racial bias in
stops and frisks in New York, Boston, and Baltimore, to
unwarranted disparities nationwide in arrests of Black[] and white[]
[people] for marijuana possession (despite comparable usage rates),
to disparities in the enforcement of minor offenses in Minneapolis,
New Jersey, and Florida, as sure as the sun rises police will continue
to enforce laws selectively against communities of color.41

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 16–17.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 19.

Ezekiel Edwards, Predictive Policing Software Is More Accurate at Predicting
Policing Than Predicting Crime, AM. C.L. UNION: SPEAK FREELY (Aug. 31, 2016),
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Echoing similar concerns regarding the use of criminal justice data
to build predictive tools, Vincent Southerland, Executive Director of
the Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at New York University
School of Law, cautions that
[A]ny system that relies on criminal justice data must contend with
the vestiges of slavery, de jure and de facto segregation, racial
discrimination, biased policing, and explicit and implicit bias, which
are part and parcel of the criminal justice system. Otherwise, these
automated tools will simply exacerbate, reproduce, and calcify the
biases they are meant to correct.42

While developers of predictive policing technologies may attempt
to control for racial biases in their algorithms by removing racespecific data, legal scholars, social scientists, and advocates remain
skeptical that race-blind algorithms will reduce racial biases in
policing.43 Instead, they warn that the use of these algorithms will
compound existing biases in the criminal legal system.44

ii. Unchecked Error: Data, Social Science, and Cognitive Biases
Commentators have also raised concerns that the use of algorithms
may introduce hard-to-identify errors into the investigative process.
Such problems can originate with simple data entry errors,45 larger
scale problems of flawed and untested social science theories
informing the creation of the models,46 and errors stemming from
automation and confirmation biases. When left unchecked, these
errors may compound and could lead to wrongful arrests and
convictions.47

https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police-practices/predictivepolicing-software-more-accurate [https://perma.cc/TX3Y-EZSE].
42. Vincent Southerland, With AI and Criminal Justice, the Devil Is in the Data,
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacyAM. C.L. UNION
technology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data
[https://perma.cc/D9C9-LAJ6].
43. See infra Section I.B.i.
44. Id.
45. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1145–50.
46. Id. at 1161–64 (“Social science, not simply technology, underlies the promise
of predictive policing.”); see also O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 87–88.
47. See infra Section I.B.ii for a discussion of ways that unchecked errors may
lead to wrongful arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

2019] A BIAS-FREE PREDICTIVE POLICING TOOL?

53

1. Data Entry Errors
Predictive policing algorithms are built on data sets and respond to
new data that are collected and entered by humans.48 Data entry
errors can occur during collection, input, and management of the
data.49 Professor Ferguson notes that examples of the data entry
error may include that of an officer mistakenly writing down the
wrong address of a crime scene (a collection error), transposing a
number or misspelling a name when entering notes into a computer
(an input error), and the accidental creation of duplicate entries or
deletion of entries when the data is integrated into a database (data
management errors).50 Such errors — especially when compounded
with other sources of human error discussed in the following Sections
— can lead to flawed predictions and unjust results.51

2. Flawed Social Science
Cathy O’Neil, author of Weapons of Math Destruction, cites
“broken windows policing”52 and the use of PredPol to predict and
patrol for nuisance level crimes as an example of how a questionable
social science theory can lead to issues in the creation and
deployment of predictive policing tools.53 Some researchers credit
the impressive drop in violent crime in New York City to the rise of
broken windows policing.54 On the other hand, other theories
attribute the drop in crime to phenomena such as “the falling rates of
48. See, e.g., Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1145.
49. Id. at 1145–46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 87. “Broken windows policing” refers to the theory
advanced by public policy expert James Q. Wilson and criminologist George Kelling
in the influential article, Broken Windows, that argued that disorder “leads to
increased fear and withdrawal from residents, which then allows more serious crime
to move in because of decreased levels of informal social control.” George L. Kelling
& James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
1982),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/
[https://perma.cc/E6CN-365K]. The theory of broken windows policing is that “[t]he
police can play a key role in disrupting this process. If they focus in on disorder and
less serious crime in neighborhoods that have not yet been overtaken by serious
crime, they can . . . prevent serious crime from infiltrating.” Broken Windows
Policing, GEORGE MASON UNIV., DEP’T CRIMINOLOGY, L., & SOC’Y, CTR. FOR
EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’Y, https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/whatworks-in-policing/research-evidence-review/broken-windows-policing/
[https://perma.cc/M59Q-5RWP] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
53. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 86–88.
54. Id. at 87–88.
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crack cocaine addiction to the booming 1990s economy,” and to the
legalization of abortion in the 1970s.55
Despite competing theories explaining NYC’s drop in crime, police
are “[r]aised on the orthodoxy of zero tolerance [and] have little more
reason to doubt the link between small crimes and big ones than the
correlation between smoke and fire.”56 As a result, this commitment
to particular social science theories, such as broken windows policing,
has informed the development and use of predictive policing tools
including PredPol. While these predictive policing tools have the
appearance that they are “not only scientific but fair,” they also may
magnify the biases inherent in the models’ underlying theories, such
as the tendency of broken windows policing to over-police poverty.57

3. Cognitive Biases
Commentators caution that biases including automation bias — the
tendency to believe a computer-generated report over that of a
human-created report58 — and confirmation bias59 can distort the

55. Id. at 87–88; see also STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, Where Have
All the Criminals Gone?, in FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 115, 121 (2005); Steven D. Levitt, Abortion and
Crime: Who Should You Believe?, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Mar. 15, 2005),
http://freakonomics.com/2005/05/15/abortion-and-crime-who-should-you-believe/
[https://perma.cc/92N3-PEES].
56. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 89.
57. Id. at 91.
PredPol, even with the best of intentions, empowers police departments to
zero in on the poor, stopping more of them, arresting a portion of those, and
sending a subgroup to prison. And the police chiefs, in many cases, if not
most, think that they’re taking the only sensible route to combating
crime . . . . The result is that we criminalize poverty, believing all the while
that our tools are not only scientific but fair.

Id.

58. See generally M.L. CUMMINGS, AMERICAN INST. OF AERONAUTICS AND
ASTRONAUTICS, AUTOMATION BIAS IN INTELLIGENT TIME CRITICAL DESIGN
SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
(2004),
http://hal.pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u13/Automation%20Bias%20in
%20Intelligent%20Time%20Critical%20Decision%20Support%20Systems.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36T5-UE6N].
59. See, e.g., Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING,
JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 79 (Rudiger F. Pohl ed., 2004); see also Erin Murphy,
Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
803, 830 (2010) (“The true risk is a leaping-to-conclusions, or confirmation bias. It is
the fear that the individual will be sucked into a morass of suspicion from which
escape is arduous or impossible — Kafka’s The Trial, not Orwell’s Big Brother.”).
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investigative process and make errors less likely to be checked than in
a human-driven process.60 Professor M.L. Cummings cautions that:
Automation bias occurs in decision-making because humans have a
tendency to disregard or not search for contradictory information in
light of a computer-generated solution that is accepted as correct
and can be exacerbated in time critical domains. Automated
decision aids are designed to reduce human error but actually can
cause new errors in the operation of a system if not designed with
human cognitive limitations in mind.61

Due to automation bias, officers may place undue confidence in
automated recommendations, whether a PredPol recommended
hotspot or an algorithm-generated list of individuals likely to be
involved in crime. Lindsey Barrett, author of Reasonably Suspicious
Algorithms, explains this phenomenon, noting that:
An algorithmic risk prediction seems like the automation of an
officer weighing fact-specific circumstances, and determining the
possibility of a crime occurring based on those facts. But an
algorithm’s determination of a high crime area or an individual’s
threat level is qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from an
officer’s judgment. An automated assessment is the product of a
greater volume of information, which furthermore may be riddled
with unknown errors, bias, or both. While an officer may make a
mistake in judgment — a possibility the preexisting standard
acknowledges — courts can understand and contextualize human
error.62

As a result, automation bias presents the two-fold risk that
computer-generated recommendations are trusted above human
judgment while simultaneously concealing potential unchecked
errors.
Another bias with the potential to distort the investigative process
is confirmation bias. This is the process in which “information is
searched for, interpreted, and remembered in such a way that it
systematically impedes the possibility that the hypothesis could be
rejected.”63 Put another way, confirmation bias in law enforcement
occurs when “[officers] form an opinion, create a theory, and then

60. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1178; see Lindsey
Barrett, Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the United States
Border, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 327, 348–49 (2017).
61. Cummings, supra note 58, at 1.
62. Barrett, supra note 60, at 348–49
63. Oswald & Grosjean, supra note 59, at 79.
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work to prove it right instead of proving it wrong.”64 Confirmation
bias may lead officers to confirm the recommendations of a predictive
policing algorithm through their follow-up investigation. Research
has shown that confirmation bias affects people not only in motivated
processes (where the person finds information to support a desired
conclusion), but also in unmotivated processes (where the person has
no interest in a particular conclusion) due to psychological
phenomena such as the primacy effect, in which “information
encountered early in the process is likely to carry more weight than
that acquired later.”65 Early information gained by an officer — that
an area is prone to crime or that a person is likely to be involved in
crime — may influence the information they unintentionally seek out,
process, and remember.
Together, automation bias and confirmation bias have the potential
to create feedback loops in which officers receive information from
predictive policing software — information likely to be presumed
accurate and bias free — that primes the officers to believe crime is
afoot in certain areas or within certain lists of people. By increasing
vigilant patrol of the area or list, the officers are likely to find
information — and make arrests — supporting the hypothesis.
Human errors in data recording, entry, and processing will
inevitably inform and be a byproduct of any predictive policing
software.66
Professor Ferguson urges police departments to
acknowledge this room for error, which he argues “does not discount
the value of predictive policing technologies but only qualifies the
findings and tempers the unquestioning acceptance of the
information.”67 This step may help to reduce automation bias as well
as “set the state for correcting error, auditing error, and training
humans to prevent error.”68

iii. Fourth Amendment Concerns
Commentators also raise concerns regarding the impact of
predictive policing tools on reasonable suspicion and probable cause
determinations.
Under the Fourth Amendment, police need

64. Amaury Murgado, Dealing with Confirmation Bias, POLICE MAG. (July 17,
2014),
https://www.policemag.com/341175/dealing-with-confirmation-bias
[https://perma.cc/ADW7-LXYH].
65. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 187 (1998).
66. See infra Section I.B.ii.
67. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1151.
68. Id.
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probable cause and a warrant (or one of any number of valid
exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme
Court) for a search,69 and they need reasonable suspicion for a Terry
investigative stop.70 The Supreme Court defines probable cause as
“more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and
circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’
an offense has been or is being committed.”71 In cases where an
informant shares information, an officer has probable cause when she
has reason to believe the tip based on a totality of the informant’s
basis of knowledge (for example, the informant personally observed
or participated in the criminal activity), their reliability (whether the
officer knows the informant to be trustworthy), and the veracity of
the tip, usually determined through independent police
corroboration.72
Such determinations inherently rely upon prediction and
probabilities. As Professor Ferguson points out, “determining what is
‘reasonable’ or whether sufficient probable cause exists in a given

69. The Fourth Amendment states that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions
to this requirement. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding
that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies when officers are in
hot pursuit of a suspect or there is danger to the officer’s or others’ safety); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that the search incident to
lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies to all arrests regardless of
underlying rationale); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 248 (1973)
(explaining that valid consent to a search waives the warrant and probable cause
requirement); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 132 (1990) (explaining the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
307 (1999) (extending the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to
passenger’s belongings).
70. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (alterations in original)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
72. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (clarifying that probable cause
exists when the totality of the circumstances suggests that the tip is reliable, without
requiring a rigid analysis of basis of knowledge, reliability, and veracity).
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case involves a predictive judgement by a judge or law enforcement
official.”73 Similarly, Barrett notes that:
Prediction is already a part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
explicitly and implicitly. A search warrant might rely on the
prediction, based on probable cause, that contraband will be found
in a certain location . . . . Fourth Amendment analysis also
frequently relies on anchoring broad probabilities to individual
suspects, such as profiles, and high crime areas, or individualized
predictions of possibly questionable reliability, such as reliance on
informant tips.74

Despite the reliance on prediction and probability in traditional
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is not clear how predictive
policing technologies factor into reasonable suspicion and probable
cause determinations. In the realm of place-based predictive policing,
magistrate judges will likely treat the prediction of areas for increased
patrol as a “relevant characteristic[] of a location in determining
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant
further investigation.”75 While the determination that an area is a
“high crime area” or “hotspot” is not sufficient for a stop or search on

73. Andrew G. Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L.J. 259, 286 (2012) [hereinafter Ferguson, Reasonable Suspicion].
74. Barrett, supra note 60, at 345.
75. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also Ferguson, Reasonable
Suspicion, supra note 73, at 308. At the time of writing, the issue of how predictive
policing affects Fourth Amendment analysis has not yet been addressed in a
published court opinion. However, the lack of litigation on the topic does not mean
that the use of predictive policing tools in probable cause analyses is not an issue.
One reason for the lack of litigation may be that officers can simply refer to an area
as “high crime” as part of a reasonable suspicion analysis without revealing whether
predictive policing tools led to the determination of the area as “high crime.” See,
e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[W]e have previously noted the fact that the stop
occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a
Terry analysis.” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972))).
Further, police departments have historically been hesitant to reveal the use of new
technologies, claiming that secrecy helps them “to prevent criminals from being
apprised in advance of what the police may be doing in a particular investigation.”
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Brennan Ctr. v. NYPD (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug.
30,
2017)
(No.
160541/2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Brennan 20-v- 20NYPD.PDF
[https://perma.cc/K683-GGWM]. Law enforcement have gone to great lengths to
conceal and avoid litigation on the constitutionality of new technologies, in some
cases, officers have even refused to testify regarding the use of policing technologies
such as cell-site simulators, leading prosecutors to dismiss serious cases to protect the
secrecy of police technology. See Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to
USA
TODAY
(Aug.
23,
2015),
Solve
Routine
Crimes,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cellsurveillance/31994181/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FB-UUYY].
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its own, Ferguson predicts that “with some relevant corroboration, a
predictive tip will serve the basis of a constitutional stop.”76
However, it is less clear how predictive policing tools will affect
probable cause or reasonable suspicion analyses in scenarios where
algorithms predict people likely to be involved in crime or link
individual suspects to potential crime patterns. Ultimately, using such
information in probable cause determinations raises serious civil
liberties concerns. The ACLU and a coalition of sixteen additional
civil rights organizations argue that:
The Fourth Amendment forbids police from stopping someone
without reasonable suspicion — a specific, individualized
determination that is more than just a hunch. Computer-driven
hunches are no exception to this rule, and a computer’s judgment is
never a further reason (beyond the articulable facts that intelligibly
caused that judgment) for a stop, search, or arrest. Similarly,
predictive policing must not be allowed to erode rights of due
process and equal protection.
Systems that manufacture
unexplained “threat” assessments have no valid place in
constitutional policing.77

It is not yet clear to what extent predictive policing tools are being
used for such determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, but scholars and advocates alike raise concerns regarding the
potential of predictive policing tools to reshape and further weaken
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.78
II. PATTERNIZR: THE NYPD’S NEWEST PREDICTIVE TOOL
A. Background on Patternizr
Data scientists at the NYPD created Patternizr in order to assist
crime analysts with identifying patterns of crimes that were
committed by the same suspect or group of suspects.79 Prior to the
development of Patternizr, NYPD analysts manually searched
through computerized records of past crimes to try to identify
patterns in criminal activity. This manual process was time intensive
and often limited to a small geographic focus, as crime analysts tend

76. Ferguson, Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 73, at 312.
77. ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS., supra note 10.
78. See, e.g., id.; Barrett, supra note 60, at 345, 346; Ferguson, Policing Predictive
Policing, supra note 11, at 1169..
79. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
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to focus on crimes that have occurred within their precincts.80
Patternizr software allows investigators to pull up a crime report on
any NYPD computer and, with the push of a button, “patternize” the
seed crime. The algorithm quickly returns a report listing ten
potentially related crimes from the NYPD’s database.81 Each
potentially related crime is scored between 0-1, representing the
strength of the software’s recommendation on whether the crimes are
related to the seed complaint.82 The investigator then manually
reviews the potential matches and decides whether or not to group
the crimes together in a pattern, reflecting a belief that the same
suspect or group of suspects are responsible for the crimes in the
pattern.83 If the investigator groups the crimes together, the crimes
are then investigated as a pattern and information from one incident,
such as a known suspect, would be used to further the investigation of
the crimes within the pattern.84

i. Examples of How Patternizr Works
The NYPD’s most cited Patternizr success story is how the
software helped them “crack[] the case of the needle-wielding
shoplifter.”85 In that case, an analyst used Patternizr to identify
similarities between two robberies in distant precincts where the
accused person was shoplifting power drills from a hardware store,
and upon being confronted, threatened — and on one of the
occasions, attacked — an employee with a hypodermic needle.86 The
analyst was able to combine these two robberies with near-identical
fact patterns with two other larcenies they believed were committed

80. See Steven Melendez, NYPD Unveils Controversial algorithm to Track Crime
FASTCOMPANY
(Mar.
20,
2019),
Patterns,

https://www.fastcompany.com/90321778/nypd-unveils-controversial-algorithm-totrack-crime-patterns [https://perma.cc/E8DZ-ZNM4] (quoting Evan Levine, codeveloper of Patternizr).
81. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 161–62.
82. Id. at 159.
83. Id. at 162.
84. Id. at 154.
85. Resoundingly
Human,
INFORMS
(Feb.
15,
2019),
https://informs.libsyn.com/2019/02 [https://perma.cc/4SNN-G8QA] (interviewing
Alex Chohlas-Wood and Evan Levine about Patternizr); see also Michael R. Sisak,
Modern Policing: Algorithm Helps NYPD Spot Crime Patterns, AP NEWS (Mar. 10,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/84fb03384368458db3d85763b5bf5b94
[https://perma.cc/W9Q6-UADL]; Melendez, supra note 80.
86. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 162.
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by the same suspect.87 The analyst then passed the information to an
NYPD detective who investigated the crimes and ultimately arrested
a suspect who later pleaded guilty to larceny and felony assault.88
Chohlas-Wood and Levine also share the example of identifying a
pattern of thefts of unattended watches and jewelry from gym lockers
in Midtown Manhattan. At the time of publication of their paper, the
investigation was ongoing, though two suspects had been identified
through video footage.89 This series of gym larcenies and the
“needle-wielding shoplifter” case are, at the time of writing, the only
two examples that the NYPD has shared with the public regarding
Patternizr’s use in identifying patterns of crime.

ii. Patternizr’s Design
Patternizr’s developers were inspired by an initial test of a
machine-learning program called “Series Finder” created by MIT
researchers in partnership with the Cambridge Police Department.90
In this initial proof-of-concept, MIT researchers created an algorithm
that identified burglary patterns that had taken analysts months to
identify manually, while also identifying patterns that the analysts had
missed.91 With a team of data scientists, Chohlas-Wood and Levine
were able to build the initial experiment into a city-wide program
using the data of the country’s largest municipal police force.92

87. Id. The paper does not specify how these additional charges were matched to
the pattern.
88. Id. The exact charges and underlying facts to which the accused pleaded guilty
are not disclosed, nor is any of the underlying evidence that led to the suspect. As a
result, it is impossible to make an independent assessment of the likelihood that the
investigators “got it right.” It is critical to note that while a guilty plea amounts to
legal guilt, it may be a strategic choice made by the defendant and not a reflection of
factual guilt.
89. Id.
90. Tong Wang et al., Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, in MACHINE
LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES 515, 516 (H. Blockeel et al.
eds., 2013); Resoundingly Human, supra note 85.
91. Robin A. Smith, Cynthia Rudin: Training Computers to Find Patterns That
Humans Miss, DUKE TODAY (Oct. 2, 2016), https://today.duke.edu/2016/10/cynthiarudin-training-computers-find-patterns-humans-miss [https://perma.cc/7L8L-FJG6].
See generally Wang et al., supra note 90.
92. Melendez, supra note 80; see also About NYPD, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page
[https://perma.cc/W3JC-JXCC] (last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (“The New York City
Police Department (NYPD) is the largest and one of the oldest municipal police
departments in the United States, with approximately 36,000 officers and 19,000
civilian employees.”).
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In their analytics-focused article, Chohlas-Wood and Levine
provide an overview of how they built the models that recommend
potentially related crimes to NYPD investigators.93 While the article
was written for an audience well-versed in applied analytics, key
takeaways for stakeholders who are not data scientists include a
better understanding of the underlying assumptions and several key
design choices that inform the software.
While other iterations of predictive policing tools have focused on
either places or people, Patternizr focuses on crimes, or, more
specifically, on the modus operandi (M.O.) of those committing the
crimes.94 Patternizr, like Series Finder, is based on the assumption
that many crimes are committed by serial offenders.95 As defined by
the MIT researchers behind Series Finder, “the M.O. is the set of
habits that the offender follows, and is a type of motif used to
characterize the pattern.”96 The underlying assumptions, as explained
by developers of Series Finder, include:
– Each M.O. is different. Criminals are somewhat self-consistent in
the way they commit crimes. However, different criminals can have
very different M.O.’s. Consider the problem of predicting
housebreaks (break-ins): Some offenders operate during weekdays
while the residents are at work; some operate stealthily at night,
while the residents are sleeping. Some offenders favor large
apartment buildings, where they can break into multiple units in one
day; others favor single-family houses, where they might be able to
steal more valuable items.
Different combinations of crime
attributes can be more important than others for characterizing
different M.O.’s.
– General commonalities in M.O. do exist. Each pattern is different
but, for instance, similarity in time and space are often important to
any pattern and should generally by weighted highly. Our method
incorporates both general trends in M.O. and also pattern-specific
trends.
– Patterns can be dynamic. Sometimes the M.O. shifts during a
pattern. For instance, a novice burglar might initially use bodily
force to open a door. A s he gains experience, he might bring a tool
with him to pry the door open. Occasionally, offenders switch
entirely from one neighborhood to another. Methods that consider

93. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
94. See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 154; Wang et al., supra note 90,
at 516.
95. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 154.
96. Wang et al., supra note 90, at 516.
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an M.O. as stationary would not naturally be able to capture these
dynamics.97

In order to build Patternizr, Chohlas-Wood and Levine focused on
three types of property crimes — robbery, burglary, and grand
larceny. They selected these crimes because there is sufficient pattern
data on these crimes, the NYPD considers them significantly serious
to warrant police intervention, and the NYPD already dedicates a
significant amount of investigative resources to more serious violent
crimes.98 The developers isolated a list of 39 distinct attributes,
including various measures of distance, date and time of occurrence,
premise type and name, whether a weapon was used, the number of
suspects, suspect height(s), suspect weight(s), property taken,
unstructured text, and the complaint narrative.99 Chohlas-Wood and
Levine then trained three models — one for each type of crime — on
“approximately 10,000 patterns between 2006 and 2015” built from
“manually identified official patterns” and “complaint records where
the same individual was arrested for multiple crimes of the same type
within a span of two days.”100 The models learned nuances in which
crime factors may be related in patterns using a complex decision-tree
based classification algorithm.101 Chohlas-Wood and Levine use the
example that grand-larceny pickpocketing is likely to happen closer in
space and time — for example, around a specific corner — than a
grand larceny shoplifting pattern, which is more likely to be spread
out across the city.102 As a result, the model would learn to weight
distance more heavily in pickpocketing complaints than in shoplifting
complaints.103
Chohlas-Wood and Levine emphasize the choice to “intentionally
design[] the algorithm to minimize disparate impact on any specific
group” by making the algorithm “completely blind to sensitive
information about potential suspects, including race and gender,
which was not included as a similarity feature for the predictive
model.”104 Additionally, they “kept potential proxy variables for
sensitive information — particularly location — extremely coarse to

97. Id. (alterations in original).
98. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 155; Resoundingly Human, supra
note 85.
99. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 156.
100. Id. at 155.
101. Id. at 159.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 160.
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ensure correlation with sensitive attributes had a very low degree of
certainty while retaining some very general information about
location.”105
Finally, and according to the developers, “most
important[ly], several levels of expert human review are still required
to establish a pattern, minimizing the potential for a seemingly likely
(but incorrect) recommendation to result in any enforcement
action.”106 To test the fairness of the model, Chohlas-Wood and
Levine looked at whether Patternizr recommended pairs of crimes
with suspects of specific racial groups at a different rate than existing
identified patterns or random pairings.107 Their findings show “no
evidence that Patternizr recommends any suspect race at a higher rate
than exists with random pairing.”108
B. Is Patternizr “Fair”?
While the NYPD and Patternizr’s developers tout its fairness and
efficacy as a predictive policing tool, advocates and technology
experts have raised concerns. A recent TechTarget article on
Patternizr cited concerns from Gartner Analyst Darin Stewart that:
As Patternizr casts its net, individuals who fit a profile inferred by
the system will be swept up. At best, this will be an insult and an
inconvenience. At worst, innocent people will be incarcerated. The
community needs to decide if the benefit of a safer community
overall is worth making that same community less safe for some of
its members who have done nothing wrong.109

Additionally, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)
cautioned that “[t]o ensure fairness the NYPD should be transparent
about the technologies it deploys and allow independent researchers
to audit these systems before they are tested on New Yorkers.”110
From available reporting on Patternizr, it appears that no one outside
of the NYPD’s in-house developers has independently assessed how
Patternizr works and whether it unintentionally replicates the
problems in other types of predictive policing.111

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 160–61.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Holak, supra note 2.
Sisak, supra note 85 (quoting Christopher Dunn, Legal Director, NYCLU).
See generally infra Section II.A.
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i. Patternizr and Racial Bias
Chohlas-Wood and Levine assert that the software is “fair”
because it leaves out “sensitive suspect attributes” such as race,
gender, and precise location.112 However, Patternizr, like other forms
of predictive policing, remains vulnerable to replicating and
compounding the racial disparities of the data on which it was
trained.113 As demonstrated in studies of both COMPAS and
PredPol, which do not include racial data but still produce raciallydisparate results, simply leaving out racial data does not mean that
the algorithm will not produce racially-disparate results.114
As the makers of COMPAS conceded, algorithms that do not
include race as a category can still produce racially disparate
results.115 Patternizr’s attributes, specifically unstructured text and
complaint narratives, could allow “sensitive attributes” such as race,
gender, and socioeconomic status to enter the algorithm through
coded language (for example, “dark complexion,” and “homeless”).
Beyond ‘back-door’ methods of race entering the algorithms, it is
likely that analysts check the suspect descriptions, including the race
and gender of suspects, when manually checking Patternizr’s
recommendations for a possible match to a seed complaint. This is
only logical; if a seed complaint describes the suspect as a 5’8”, 170pound white woman, the analyst can quickly eliminate any
recommendations where the suspect is not a white woman, as
Patternizr has already screened for height and weight similarities.
This may have the inadvertent effect of making sensitive suspect
attributes like race and sex more material in the investigator’s manual
review process. If the algorithm already suspects the crimes are a
match, and the investigator can rule out other recommendations due
to the suspect’s demographic information, an investigator might
overvalue a match of race and sex, as it would confirm rather than
reject the software’s recommendation.116
This design feature,
intended to eliminate racial bias from Patternizr, could actually
increase analysts’ reliance on racial data when matching crimes to a
pattern.
Matching race and sex with individual suspect descriptions is not
inherently problematic. In their review, an investigator would likely

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 157, 163.
See supra Section I.B.i.
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
Angwin et al., supra note 26.
See infra Section I.B.ii.
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ensure that a suspect matches all available data points, whether those
data points include race, sex, height, facial features, or tattoos.117
However, the confluence of automation bias, confirmation bias, and
racial bias could lead investigators to rush to conclusions.118 Due to
automation bias, analysts are likely to believe Patternizr’s
recommendation is correct.119 Additionally, implicit and explicit
racial biases may enter into the manual check of race and sex by the
analyst at this stage. For example, an analyst who implicitly or
explicitly believes that Black men are more likely to commit
burglaries may be less likely to question a Patternizr recommendation
of a Black man as a suspect for a burglary than a recommendation of
a white woman for the same crime. If the sex and race match — and
this data conforms to the analyst’s notion of what is likely in the given
scenario — the analyst may gain confidence in the recommendation
and then seek out additional inculpatory information while failing to
seek out or overlooking information that might be exculpatory for the
suspect recommended by Patternizr.120
In a test for racial impact, Patternizr’s developers determined that
the software is no more likely to group patterns of crimes together by
race of the suspect than crime analysts’ manual pattern matching or
random matching.121 Chohlas-Wood and Levine do not include
statistics on the racial makeup of the database of crimes on which
they trained the models. It is likely that the NYPD crime database
significantly overrepresents people of color, specifically Black and
Latinx men, due to over-policing and biases in crime reporting.122

117. See, e.g., N.Y. DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., NEW YORK STATE STANDARD
PRACTICES
MANUAL
75
(2018),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpractices/downloads/standardpractices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6CF-ZFNQ]. This manual advises law enforcement that “[a]rrest
warrants should contain as many available identifiers as possible,” including
identifiers such as hairstyles, scars, marks and tattoos, complexion, and facial hair. Id.
118. See supra Section I.B.ii.3.
119. See supra Section I.B.ii.3.
120. See supra Section I.B.ii.3.
121. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1; Resoundingly Human, supra note 85.
122. See, e.g., GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP.,ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES
(2007); Brendan Cheney, NYPD Hosted Government-Wide Conference on Racial
Disparities, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2018/11/12/nypd-hosted-secret-government-wide-conference-on-racialdisparities-693271 [https://perma.cc/7VAK-QUNY]; Racial Disparities Evident in
New York City Arrest Data for Marijuana Possession, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 14,
2018),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/racial-disparities-in-nyc-arrest-datamarijuana-possession/ [https://perma.cc/HZN2-NM88]; see also Friedman, supra note
30; Gillooly, supra note 31; infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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When Black and Latinx men are already disproportionately overrepresented in the suspect pool due to biased policing, they will be
more likely to be recommended as matches to new crimes. The racial
bias works similarly as in Lum and Isaac’s study of PredPol, but
instead of narrowing in on 500 square feet of a city for likely crime,
Patternizr narrows in on a list of likely crime (and, in cases with leads,
suspect) matches.123 The data populating the system are derived from
policing and community-reporting, which are often rife with bias.124
For this reason, advocates should be concerned that Patternizr will
compound these biases as the software focuses its enforcement on the
universe of previously-identified suspects.

ii. Patternizr and the Potential for Unchecked Errors
The use of Patternizr may lead to errors that are particularly
challenging to detect, based on a series of data and human
interpretation vulnerabilities.
These include the theoretical
underpinnings informing the design of Patternizr, data accuracy
vulnerabilities, and cognitive biases that may compound potential
errors, including automation and confirmation biases.125 A mistaken
pattern and string of events leading to the arrest and prosecution of
the wrong person has dire consequences. All too often, criminal
defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not commit as a riskmitigation strategy.126 For those who do go to trial, there are still far
too many cases where individuals are convicted but later determined
not to be guilty.127 While the right to a fair trial should serve as a

123. See Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 15–16.
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Section I.B.
126. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY:
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW
TO
SAVE
IT
6
(2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/Document/TrialPenaltySixthAmendmentRighttoTrialNearExt
inct [https://perma.cc/GT24-8M5V].
The virtual elimination of the option of taking a case to trial has so
thoroughly tipped the scales of justice against the accused that the danger of
government overreach is ever present. And on a human level, for the
defense attorney there is no more heart-wrenching task than explaining to a
client who very likely may be innocent that they must seriously consider
pleading guilty or risk the utter devastation of the remainder of their life
with incalculable impacts on family.

Id.

127. See, e.g., DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/9HKF-59F3] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
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bulwark against wrongful prosecutions, this aspiration is simply not
the reality of the criminal legal system.128 As such, it is critical that
developers and departments using Patternizr or similar predictive
policing tools critically evaluate and seek to remedy the potential for
unchecked error.
Patternizr is built upon the criminological theories that many
crimes are committed by serial offenders and that these offenders
have habits or M.O.s that can be detected as crime patterns.129
Chohlas-Wood and Levine discuss the many choices that they made
while designing Patternizr, but they rarely explain why they made
these choices and the theories informing these choices.130 More
transparency on these design choices and theories would allow
observers to point out its inevitable blind spots.
Just as it is important to evaluate the underlying theories informing
the algorithm, it is also important to consider what theories did not
inform Patternizr’s design. For example, analysts might consider the
research on juveniles in the criminal legal system that shows that most
juveniles “age out” of crime.131 However, a juvenile’s prior acts
committed during a distinct phase might lead Patternizr to identify
them as a suspect of similar crimes for years after they are likely to
have matured and ceased committing crimes.132 Similarly, analysts
might consider whether a case received media attention to better
determine whether a similar crime was likely committed by the same
suspect or a copycat.133
Regardless of the underlying criminological theories informing
Patternizr, predictive policing tools are based on theories and

128. See NAT’L ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 126.
129. See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 154; Wang et al., supra note 90,
at 515–16. Chohlas-Wood & Levine support this assumption with only one source
from the 1980s.
130. See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
131. See, e.g., Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an
Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769, 786 (2016); Marc D.
Rudolph et. al., At Risk of Being Risky: The Relationship Between “Brain Age”
Under Emotional States and Risk Preference, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 93 (2017).
132. See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1. Chohlas-Wood and Levine do not
discuss factoring this phenomena of juveniles “aging out” of crime into the
development of Patternizr.
133. See Ray Surette, Copycat Crime and Copycat Criminals: Concepts and
Research Questions, 18 J. CRIM. JUST. & POP. CULTURE 49, 50 (Dec. 2016) (“For a
crime to be a media generated copycat crime it must have been inspired by an earlier,
media-publicized or portrayed crime — that is, there must be a pair of crimes linked
through the media.”).
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assumptions made by humans.134 Those acting on Patternizr’s
recommendations should not lose sight of the human choices —
including potential blind spots and flaws — that inform its
recommendations. While these serious issues raise questions as to
whether such predictive tools should be used at all, investigators and
officers who use Patternizr should, at the very least, be trained on the
limitations and potential errors of Patternizr.
Patternizr may introduce error into the pattern-analysis process
because of issues in data recording and entry.135 This could be the
result of errors in the original data set on which the model was
trained, where an error as simple as a mistyped word could skew the
algorithm’s understanding of the factors creating a pattern.136 Errors
in the seed complaint could also lead to false positives. For example,
if an officer writes that a shoplifter threatened an employee with a
needle, this case might match the much-talked about hypodermic
needle-wielding shoplifter of power drills. However, the story sounds
very different if additional details are recorded, such as that the
shoplifter threatened the employee with a knitting needle and walked
off with several bundles of yarn at a craft store. Or, take for example
if the word drill is mistyped ‘drinl.’ Did the shoplifter take a power
drill or a soft drink? Will Patternizr match this seed complaint to a
series of larcenies at hardware stores or low-level drink and snack
thefts from neighborhood corner stores?
Patternizr’s developers emphasize that multiple levels of expert
review are still needed to establish a pattern — mitigating the risk
that a seemingly likely, but false, recommendation results in police
action.137 Debra Piehl, the NYPD’s senior crime analyst, assured
reporters that “it still allows the analysts that work for me to apply
their own thinking and analysis. The science doesn’t overwhelm the
art.”138 While crime analysts will hopefully be able to catch errors in
many circumstances, Patternizr could make such error-detection
harder based on cognitive biases in favor of automated
information.139 Patternizr, like other algorithms, is vulnerable to
errors arising from data quality control issues,140 flawed assumptions

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
See supra Section I.B.ii.1.
See, e.g., Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1145–50.
Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 161–61.
Holak, supra note 2.
See supra Section I.B.ii.
See supra Section I.B.ii.1.
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informing the design of the models,141 and cognitive biases that lead
people to believe computers and to seek information confirming an
early hypothesis.142
Patternizr may make investigators more efficient, but it may also
make investigators less accurate. It is not clear from available
information what, if any, steps are being taken to acknowledge and
counteract these vulnerabilities for error. Patternizr’s developers and
departments using Patternizr or similar predictive policing tools
should work to ensure accuracy in the data recording and input
processes, rigorously question the underlying theories informing the
creation of the model and implement protocols to combat the rush to
judgement to which automation and confirmation biases contribute.

iii. Patternizr and Fourth Amendment Issues
Patternizr holds the potential to link new crime reports to cases
with an identified suspect, allowing investigators to narrow in on a
single suspect whose M.O. may match prior crime(s).143 This raises
important questions of how potential pattern matches are being used
in determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. For
example, if an investigator “patternizes” a burglary and Patternizer
suggests that it matches a closed case to which the suspect pleaded
guilty, the investigator now has a name and address for a top suspect.
A critical and unanswered question is: Can the investigator use this
tip from Patternizr to articulate probable cause? While there may be
a temptation to use a Patternizr recommendation as justification for a
search warrant, Patternizr should not be used as an independent
factor in probable cause determinations.
A Patternizr score is only as strong as the underlying data giving
rise to the recommendation. If an investigator relies upon the
underlying data alone (surfaced by Patternizr), and not the Patternizr
score, the probable cause analysis will be the same as if the pattern
had been manually identified by an analyst.144 However, the Fourth
Amendment analysis is weakened and made more difficult for judges

141. See supra Section I.B.ii.2.
142. See supra Section I.B.ii.3.
143. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
144. There may be other constitutional issues related to the underlying information
used in the probable cause analysis. For example, the Bronx Defenders are currently
challenging the NYPD’s continued storage of sealed criminal arrest records in their
database and continued use of these records for investigatory purposes. See, e.g.,
Brief for Petitioner, R.C. v. City of New York (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (No. 1537392018).
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to review if the investigator is permitted to use the Patternizr
recommendation itself as part of the probable cause determination.
The data informing the recommendation is made up of police reports,
and the evidence in the reports and any additional officer
corroboration should be enough to form the basis for probable cause
without a Patternizr recommendation.145 The fact that a computer
algorithm suggests two crimes might be linked should not be
considered evidence in its own right.
For the same reason, a Patternizr recommendation or score should
not count towards the totality of the circumstances giving rise to
probable cause. Counting it towards the totality of the circumstances
risks double-counting factors already taken into account by the
algorithm. For example, if the investigator in the hypodermic needlewielding shoplifter case cited the similarities between the crimes (the
underlying data) and the high Patternizr score as reasons for granting
a warrant, the inclusion of the Patternizr score in the analysis would
be inappropriate double-counting.146 While there is no reporting to
suggest that Patternizr scores and recommendations are being used in
probable cause determinations, attorneys should remain vigilant to
the potential expanded use of Patternizr in probable cause and
reasonable suspicion determinations.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVOCATES AND POLICYMAKERS
Advocates and policymakers face important questions regarding
the use of predictive policing technologies. A first critical question is
whether such technologies should be used at all. While some
commentators believe predictive policing is inevitable and should be
better managed, many activists and advocacy organizations have
urged lawmakers to ban predictive policing technologies altogether.147
This debate over the use of predictive policing largely occurs outside

145. See supra Section I.B.ii.4.
146. This is similar to the issue of judges using COMPAS scores in addition to
other factors in sentencing, raised in a ProPublica report on COMPAS and racial
bias. See Angwin et al., supra note 26. The reason for this is that the factors the judge
considers separate from the score is likely already built into the score. Id.
147. See Eva Ruth Moravec, Do Algorithms Have a Place in Policing?, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/do-algorithmshave-place-policing/596851/ [https://perma.cc/VA8W-Q4X5]. Activists like Hamid
Khan and Jamie Garcia, of the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition work to ban the use of
predictive policing technologies altogether. Id.; see also Ferguson, Policing Predictive
Policing, supra note 11. Professor Ferguson suggests that predictive policing is
inevitable, but he puts forward a framework for evaluating and better managing the
technologies as they are developed. Id. at 1188–89.
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of the realm of police decision-making, however, as police policies are
seldom subjected to the same level of democratic review as those of
other government agencies.148 As such, a good starting place would
be to ensure a robust public debate and democratic oversight over
whether, and how, these tools are used.149 The following considers
two potential strategies for reform-minded advocates and policymakers to eliminate or reduce the potential harms of predictive
policing tools like Patternizr, including an outright ban and steps
towards better regulation of such tools.
A. Considerations for Banning the Use of Predictive Policing Tools
Such as Patternizr
In the current context of policing in the United States, many
advocates and activists warn against equipping law enforcement with
any new predictive tools that may perpetuate racially-biased policing
practices and which may erode Fourth Amendment protections.150
The Movement for Black Lives policy agenda includes a goal of the
“[t]otal prohibition on the acquisition of any new surveillance
technology or development of surveillance program,” and a demand
that “[f]ederal and local agencies should prevent the use of predictive
systems that erode the Fourth Amendment.”151 The ACLU and a
coalition of sixteen civil rights organizations, including the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 18 Million Rising, the
Brennan Center for Justice, the NAACP, Data & Society Research
Institute, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, caution that:
The institution of American policing, into which these systems are
being introduced, is profoundly flawed: it is systemically biased
against communities of color and allows unconscionable abuses of
police power. Predictive policing tools threaten to provide a

148. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1827, 1907 (2015).
149. This is, in part, underway in New York City with the creation of the
Automated Decision Systems Task Force. See NYC AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS
TASK
FORCE,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/adstaskforce/index.page
[https://perma.cc/K9HB-DRGF] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
150. See Chinyere Tutashinda & Malkia Cyril, An End to the Mass Surveillance of

Black Communities, and the End to the Use of Technologies that Criminalize and
Target Our Communities (Including IMSI Catchers, Drones, Body Cameras, and
Predictive
Policing
Software),
MOVEMENT
FOR
BLACK
LIVES,

https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/ [https://perma.cc/N6X3-X6Z6] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019); End Broken Windows Policing: Policy Solutions, CAMPAIGN
ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/brokenwindows [https://perma.cc/4V48C7EZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019); ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS., supra note 10.
151. Tutashinda & Cyril, supra note 150.
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misleading and undeserved imprimatur of impartiality for an
institution that desperately needs fundamental change. Systems that
are engineered to support the status quo have no place in American
policing.152

Campaign Zero, a campaign to end police violence in America,
lists ending the use of predictive policing technology among its
recommended policy solutions for ending broken windows policing.153
Campaign Zero explains that predictive policing technology “uses
systematically biased data to enhance police profiling of Black people
and communities.”154
While NYPD leadership claims that Patternizr is immune from the
issues that plague earlier versions of predictive policing
technologies,155 this Article argues that Patternizr is likely to further
exacerbate racial biases that are entrenched within policing and the
criminal legal system at large.156 This Article has also investigated the
potential of cognitive biases, such as automation bias and
confirmation bias, that are likely to further exacerbate problems
caused by racially-biased data, in addition to raising unanswered
questions concerning Fourth Amendment protections and the use of
Patternizr.157 Patternizr should not be immune from the criticisms of
other predictive policing technologies, nor should advocates and
policymakers take the NYPD’s word that it is bias-free without a
rigorous independent review.
Given what is known about Patternizr and the troubling findings
on the impacts of other predictive policing tools built on similarly
racially biased data, policymakers and advocates who seek to ban
Patternizr and other predictive policing technologies are not taking a
radical position. Nearly every leading advocacy organization in the
field of police accountability has either issued a dire warning against
the use of predictive policing technologies158 or gone further to adopt
the ban of predictive policing technologies as part of their policy
platform.159 Advocates and police-reform-aligned policymakers at

152. ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS., supra note 10.
153. End Broken Windows Policing: Policy Solutions, supra note 150.
154. Id.
155. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1.
156. See supra Section I.B.i.
157. See supra Sections I.B.iii, I.B.iv.
158. ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS., supra note 10.
159. End Broken Windows Policing: Policy Solutions, supra note 150; Tutashinda
& Cyril, supra note 150.
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the local and state level can and should push for the halt of the use of
predictive policing technologies by law enforcement.
B. Regulating the Use of Patternizr to Minimize Harm
Alternatively, advocates and policymakers may seek to take a
more pragmatic approach to regulating the use of predictive policing
technologies including Patternizr. This Section outlines several steps
that policymakers and advocates can take to minimize the potential
harm of predictive policing tools like Patternizr.

i. Ensure Democratic Accountability and Transparency
As policing tools and surveillance tactics become more advanced,
democratic oversight is critical to ensure that civil rights and liberties
are adequately protected.160 In order to have true democratic
accountability over the tools and tactics used by our police forces, we
must first have transparency.161 The NYPD should open up its
database and use of Patternizr to an independent audit to determine
whether the algorithm risks perpetuating racial disparities within the
criminal legal system.162 Policymakers in local and state government
can facilitate such an audit by requiring the NYPD to stop using
Patternizr and any other predictive policing technologies until an
160. See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER
POLICE SURVEILLANCE: TECHNOLOGY 101 2 (2016) [hereinafter ACLU, COMMUNITY
CONTROL], https://www.aclu.org/report/community-control-over-police-surveillancetechnology-101 [https://perma.cc/JHB2-ZZ9A]; Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 148, at 1831.
161. The NYPD closely guards and avoids disclosing information regarding its use
of predictive policing tools. In 2016, the Brennan Center for Justice requested
information about the NYPD’s use of predictive policing tools pursuant to New
York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90
(Mckinney 2017). After two years of litigation, the Brennan Center was able to
obtain some documents regarding the NYPD’s tests, purchases, and implementation
of predictive tools. NYPD PREDICTIVE POLICING DOCUMENTS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST.
(July
12,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research[https://perma.cc/RBA6-JFAZ].
reports/nypd-predictive-policing-documents
According to the Brennan Center, “[t]he difficult process to get access to this
information, and the piecemeal production [the Brennan Center] ultimately
received . . . reveal[s] the NYPD’s quest to keep the public in the dark about this
technology.” Id.
162. See Melendez, supra note 80.
Any predictive policing platform runs the risks of perpetuating disparities
because of the over-policing of communities of color that will inform their
inputs. To ensure fairness, the NYPD should be transparent about the
technologies it deploys and allows independent researchers to audit these
systems before they are tested on New Yorkers.
Id. (quoting NYLCU Legal Director Christopher Dunn).
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independent audit has been conducted.
After a thorough,
independent audit, policymakers should require a public presentation
of the findings. A robust and informed public discussion should then
precede a vote by a democratically accountable assembly, such as the
City Council.163 Such democratic safeguards are critical for the
legitimacy of law enforcement and ensuring that modern policing
techniques do not overstep Constitutional limitations.164

ii. Require Disclosure of Predictive Policing Tools in Criminal Cases
In addition to calling for more transparency and oversight
regarding the use of predictive policing tools by the NYPD and other
police departments, advocates — especially criminal defense
attorneys — should push for requirements that prosecutors disclose
the use of predictive policing tools and decision support models in
arriving at the arrest and prosecution of individual defendants. The
same problems identified in Section I.B.i, including racial,
automation, and confirmation biases may compromise investigations,
reveal a lack of probable cause, and could possibly exculpate
individual defendants. Criminal defense attorneys, judges, and juries
should have this information in order to better evaluate the
government’s case against the defendant and to more fully interrogate
the process leading to the arrest and prosecution.
Absent proactive disclosure from the prosecution, criminal defense
attorneys have no way of knowing whether a predictive policing tool
like Patternizr helped to identify their client. Defense attorneys in
jurisdictions using Patternizr165 should be alert to the potential use of
Patternizr in their cases involving charges of robbery, burglary, or
grand larceny — the crimes for which the NYPD is currently using
Patternizr166 — where the defendant is charged with two or more
similar crimes, or where their current charge is similar to a past crime
for which they were charged.167 Defense attorneys should be

163. See ACLU, COMMUNITY CONTROL, supra note 160, at 2; Friedman &
Ponomarenko, supra note 148, at 1838.
164. See ACLU, COMMUNITY CONTROL, supra note 160, at 2; Friedman &
Ponomarenko, supra note 148, at 1838.

.

165. At the time of writing, the NYPD — the initial developer of Patternizr — was
the only police department that had publicly announced its use of Patternizr.
166. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 154. In an interview, Chohlas-Wood
commented that he would like to see Patternizr expanded to include petit larceny.
Resoundingly Human, supra note 85.
167. According to a lawsuit brought by the Bronx Defenders, the NYPD regularly
uses sealed arrest information in criminal investigations. See Complaint at 1–2, R.C.
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especially alert to the potential use of Patternizr in situations where
their clients are accused of committing crimes across precinct and
police command jurisdictions, as it is unlikely that the NYPD would
have recognized such a pattern without the use of Patternizr.168
In cases where defense attorneys suspect predictive policing tools
were used to identify their client, they may be able to argue that the
prosecution has a constitutional obligation to disclose whether a
predictive algorithm was used as well as any reports generated by the
tool.169 Under Brady v. Maryland, the government is required to
disclose all material, exculpatory evidence in advance of trial to the
defense.170 However, this argument will not succeed without showing
a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of the use of predictive
policing tools will affect the outcome of the trial.171 This is a tall
order in the context of predictive policing, where the algorithm is an
investigative tool — albeit, a tool with flaws that could lead to
wrongful convictions172 — and, in most contexts, not actual evidence
in its own right.173 As a result, it may be challenging for a defense
attorney to show that the disclosure of the use of predictive policing
tools would have been exculpatory and material enough to affect the
outcome of a case.174
In the context of Patternizr, however, defense attorneys can argue
that a Patternizr report with other potential crime patterns and
alternative suspects should be considered Brady material. Prosecutors
have an obligation to disclose evidence that suggests someone other
than the accused committed the crime.175 Defense attorneys can
argue that a high Patternizr probability score for a crime committed
by another person must be disclosed.176 A failure to investigate other

v. City of New York (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (No. 153739-2018). It is likely that
Patternizr also uses sealed records that defense attorneys may not have access to.
Defense attorneys concerned about the use of Patternizr in a case should ask their
client whether they have any past arrests related to the crime, even if those arrests
happened when the client was a juvenile or have been dismissed and sealed.
168. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 155.
169. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
170. Id.
171. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995).
172. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
173. However, the defense could question investigating officers regarding the use
of a flawed predictive policing tool in order to call into question the credibility of the
investigation.
174. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Kyles, 524 U.S. at 422.
175. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
176. The defense can make a similar argument that a probable pattern containing a
crime for which the defendant is very likely not to have committed should be
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suspects from a list of potential crime patterns raises questions about
the validity of the investigation, and therefore should be made
available to the defense as impeachment material against
investigating officers.
In jurisdictions with discovery laws that are more expansive than
constitutional requirements,177 statutory arguments may prove more
fruitful in obtaining disclosure of the use of predictive policing tools
under provisions calling for the disclosure of police reports and notes
related to the case.
New York State recently passed a law reforming its discovery
practices, which will go into effect on January 1, 2020.178 The new law
— N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245 — replaces New York’s current
discovery statute, called the “blindfold” law because it “keep[s]
people accused of crimes completely in the dark about critical
evidence against them,” allowing prosecutors to withhold evidence
until the day of trial.179 The new law requires prosecutors to share
discoverable materials with the defense within fifteen calendar days
of the defendant’s arraignment.180
In addition to drastically
reforming the timeframe in which evidence must be disclosed, § 245
also enumerates a non-exhaustive list of automatically discoverable
materials — materials that the prosecution is required to disclose
even if not specifically requested by the defense.181 These materials
include evidence such as statements by the defendant and codefendants to law enforcement, grand jury testimony, names and

disclosed as Brady material. This could apply to situations where Patternizr
recommends a crime pattern that is rejected by an analyst, but where the defendant
could not have committed one of the crimes in the likely pattern — that is, if the
defendant has a reliable alibi for the similar crime or evidence suggests that the crime
pattern was committed by someone else.
177. According to a report by the Center for Court Innovation, New York joined
46 other states that have adopted comparable open discovery laws. KRYSTAL
RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK:
MAJOR
LEGISLATIVE
PROVISIONS
3
(2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/DiscoveryNYS_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/79SH-QBMU] (citing DONNA LIEBERMAN &
ISABELLE KIRSHNER, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TAKE OFF THE BLINDFOLD:
REFORM
NEW
YORK
DISCOVERY
LAW
(2019),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/take-blindfold-reform-ny-discovery-lawcommentary [https://perma.cc/2AAN-ARLX]).
178. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245 (McKinney 2020); see also RODRIGUEZ, supra
note 177.
179. LIEBERMAN & KIRSHNER, supra note 177.
180. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.10(1).
181. Id. § 245.20(1)(a)–(u).
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contact information for witnesses, police reports, notes taken by
police and other investigators, and law enforcement agency reports.182
Section 245’s enumeration of automatically discoverable materials
offers promising avenues for defenders to obtain information on the
NYPD’s use of predictive policing tools like Patternizr in individual
cases.183 Under subsection (e), the government must automatically
disclose “all police reports, notes of police and other investigators,
and law enforcement agency reports.”184 When a crime analyst or
officer enters a crime into their system and selects to “patternize” the
crime,185 the output of the Patternizr process — a list of potential
crime patterns and scores — should be interpreted to be a law
enforcement report, falling under the plain language of subsection
(e), and as such, subject to automatic disclosure.186 While these
reports should be automatically disclosed, it is likely that the NYPD
and prosecutors will argue for a narrow interpretation of the new law,
and as such, defense attorneys will need to push for disclosure of
Patternizr reports. When the new law takes effect, defense attorneys
should request Patternizr reports in all property crime cases, arguing
that they fall under § 245.20(1)(e).

iii. Implement Training and Procedures to Reduce the Impact of
Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases, including automation bias and confirmation bias,
may be ingrained in the human brain and, as a result, may be
impossible to completely overcome and challenging to reduce.187
Police departments and the creators of predictive policing
technologies such as Patternizr would benefit from engaging with
experts on cognitive biases188 to better understand the impacts of such
biases and specific methods to reduce the harms of cognitive biases
when developing and implementing predictive technologies. The

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
See id.
Id. § 245.20(1)(e).
Resoundingly Human, supra note 85.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20(1)(e).

See, e.g. RÜDIGER F. POHL ET AL., COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON

FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 3 (Rüdiger F. Pohl
ed., 2005) (“[A cognitive] illusion is hard if not impossible to avoid . . . . For some
illusions, a proper instruction, careful selection of the material, or other procedural
variations may reduce or even eliminate the illusion . . . while for other illusions, most
(if not all) attempts to overcome the effect have failed.” (alterations in original)).
188. Experts on cognitive biases can be found in several social science fields,
including behavioral economics and psychology. See, e.g., id. at xi–xii.
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NYPD could, for example, work with an outside expert to consult on
the impact of cognitive biases on the use of Patternizr and the risk of
unchecked error that such biases exacerbate. Such experts may be
able to tailor specific recommendations in terms of training and
procedures to avoid making bias-influenced errors.
Existing literature on the impacts of cognitive biases on policing
suggest two main ways of reducing the impact of automation and
confirmation biases on the use of predictive policing tools.189 These
suggestions include providing law enforcement with training on the
limits and problems of predictive tools as well as requiring procedures
to disrupt the influence of biases and rigorously test hypotheses.190
In his recommendations for responding to issues arising from
problems with flawed data, Professor Ferguson advocates for
predictive policing systems to acknowledge error as a contrast to the
conventional assumption that algorithms cannot be biased or
incorrect.191 Ferguson argues that, by acknowledging room for error,
police departments will be more likely to audit for errors and better
able to correct errors by training the staff who use the algorithms to
prevent the errors to which the algorithm may be susceptible.192
Additionally, training on the limitations of predictive policing tools
like Patternizr may empower officers using the decision-support
system to more critically evaluate the recommendations made by the
system, helping to reduce the impact of automation bias.193
In addition to training, protocols that create opportunities to
question hypotheses and disrupt confirmation bias may help reduce
the combined impact of automation bias and confirmation bias in the
context of predictive policing tools like Patternizr. Behavioral
economists suggest mental exercises to overcome biased thinking
including making at least three different estimates (for example,
asking oneself who are three possible suspects, or what are three
possible M.O.s for this crime), using “premortems” where the task
requires “imagin[ing] a future failure and then explain[ing] the
cause,” attempting to evaluate the hypothesis as an “outsider” to the
work, seeking outside advice or review from others, contemplating
other options that perhaps have not been fully considered, and
challenging motivated biases by establishing “trip wires” (i.e., setting

189. For a discussion of the impact of automation and confirmation biases on how
predictive policing tools are used, see supra Section I.B.ii.3.
190. See Murgado, supra note 64, at 4.
191. Ferguson, Policing Predicting Policing, supra note 11, at 1151.
192. See id.
193. See supra Section I.B.i.3.
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a date by which an investigation must be sufficient to move along or
the investigation must be abandoned).194
Amaury Murgado, a retired special operations lieutenant with a
Florida Sheriff’s Office, applies similar suggestions to the law
enforcement context in his article Dealing with Confirmation Bias
published by Police Magazine.195 Murgado suggests that officers “try
to disprove [their] theories instead of trying to prove them.”196 He
cautions that gut instincts can be helpful in providing possible
avenues for exploration by the officer, but that they should not be
treated as conclusive.197 By summarizing D. Kim Rossmo’s Criminal
Investigative Failures, Murgado provides a list of ten key techniques
for officers to reduce confirmation bias, including recommendations
ranging from trainings for officers on confirmation bias, encouraging
a culture of impartiality, neutrality, and open inquiry, organizing
brainstorming sessions where creativity is sought and early consensus
or groupthink is avoided, asking “how do we know what we think we
know” throughout the investigative process, and seeking out expert
opinions when appropriate.198
In an effort to reduce the impact of automation bias and
confirmation bias on the use of Patternizr, the NYPD should
implement trainings to ensure that officers understand how these
common biases may lead to incorrect — and, in the context of the
criminal legal system, terribly unjust — results. Further, the NYPD
should implement procedures for the use of Patternizr, that integrate
the above-discussed methods, such as requiring officers to write down
the reason for deciding that a series of crimes is a pattern, what other
options existed (other crimes, other suspects, deciding that there was
no match, etc.), and why they did not select those other options.
Additionally, the NYPD could require regular check-ins with
supervisors or peers where analysts and officers’ hypotheses are
challenged and alternatives are seriously considered. Such trainings
and procedures are unlikely to fully eliminate the impact of cognitive
biases on the use of Patternizr and other predictive policing tools, but
194. See Jack B. Soll et al., Outsmart Your Own Biases, HARV. BUS. REV. 4, 5, 11
(May
2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/05/outsmart-your-own-biases
[https://perma.cc/LF7E-UA4W].
195. Murgado, supra note 64.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 4 (citing D. KIM ROSSMO, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES:
AVOIDING
THE
PITFALLS
(2005),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/events/documents/
Avoiding%20Pitfalls%20Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKD2-NYQ5]).
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they may help to reduce the chances of unchecked biases leading to
wrongful arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

iv. Acknowledge and Address Racial Disparities in Underlying Crime
Data
In addition to providing trainings and procedures to reduce the
impact of cognitive biases, police departments using Patternizr and
other predictive policing tools must take steps to eliminate the racial
biases of the underlying data from which predictive tools are built.
The first step is to acknowledge — and to be transparent — about the
racial biases embedded in the algorithm’s source data. Publicly
available NYPD crime data shows that Black and Latinx people are
vastly overrepresented in the suspect and arrest pool for crime
overall, including property crimes.199 Based on available information,
Patternizr was likely trained on racially biased data that oversamples
crimes where people of color have been identified as suspects.200
Researchers and criminal justice stakeholders from a range of
perspectives agree that people of color are overrepresented in arrests
for low-level offenses due to the aggressive broken windows policing
in neighborhoods of color.201 However, there is less research as to
why racial disparities exist in victim-reported crimes, including
property crimes. A report by the Sentencing Project grapples with
this question, suggesting that, “[t]he disproportionate rate of [B]lack
crime should not be surprising given that African Americans are far
more likely than whites to experience and to live in communities with
concentrated disadvantage.”202 The report goes on to suggest that

199. See JAMES P. O’NEILL, NYPD, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW
YORK
CITY
(JAN.
1
–
DEC
31,
2018)
4
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/year-end2018-enforcement-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5L5-8ELL]. “Robbery arrestees are
most frequently Black (60.5%) or Hispanic (30.5%).” Id. “Grand Larceny arrestees
are most frequently Black (51.8%) or Hispanic (28.3%).” Id. at 6. According to the
latest information from the U.S. Census Bureau, 24.3% of New York City residents
identify as Black or African American, and 29.1% of New York residents identify as
Hispanic or Latinx. QuickFacts: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
[https://perma.cc/S267https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork
CUQX] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
200. See generally O’NEILL, supra note 199; QuickFacts: New York City, New
York, supra note 199.
201. See, e.g., THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PROACTIVE POLICING:
EFFECTS ON CRIME, COMMUNITIES, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 251 (David Weisburd &
Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2018).
202. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & CHRISTOPHER LEWIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
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“the criminal justice system does not simply mirror these differences
in crime rates — it exacerbates them through codified policies and
individual discretion.”203
Individual discretion in the reporting and response to property
crimes may at least partially explain racial disparities in property
crime data.204 For example, people of color may be more likely to be
reported for shoplifting offenses because of a heightened suspicion of
shoplifting by store employees and security.205
While many
206
shoplifting
shoplifting offenses are charged as petit larceny,
offenses can rise to the level of a grand larceny charge if the items
taken are valued at $1000 or more.207 Additionally, some New York
City retailers have a practice of presenting low-level shoplifters with a
trespass notice, alerting them that they are not welcome to return to
the store, after which even low-dollar shoplifting can lead to felony
burglary charges.208 In this example, the racial biases of store
employees lead to increased surveillance of Black customers and
subsequent disproportionate reporting of Black suspects of
shoplifting offenses.209 As a result, the racial bias of private actors
impacts the reporting of crime and therefore contributes to the
overrepresentation of people of color in both the data used to train
Patternizr and the suspect pool of potential crime patterns to which
Patternizr suggests matches.
These racial biases that are built into algorithms cannot easily be
undone. Unlike training users of Patternizr on automation and
confirmation biases so that they can more critically engage with
Patternizr’s recommendations, Patternizr’s racial bias problem starts
PUNITIVE
POLICIES
20
(2014),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Race-and-Punishment.pdf [https://perma.cc/35P8-DC8V].
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206. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 2019). The developers of Patternizr
expressed interest in expanding the use of the algorithm to petit larceny, however, at
the time of writing, the NYPD has only disclosed that Patternizr is used for grand
larceny, robbery, and burglary crimes. Resoundingly Human, supra note 85.
207. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30.
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Theft Charges Serious Crimes Punishable by Prison Time, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sep. 8,
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with its source data.210 No amount of implicit bias trainings for
officers or crime analysts can solve the problem of vast racial
disparities in the very data from which the algorithm was built. The
only way to solve the problem of racial bias in the data predictive
policing tools use is to eliminate racial biases from policing as a
whole. Without first addressing racial biases in policing as a whole,
tools that make police more efficient will, at best, make police more
efficient at the status quo of biased policing, and at worst, compound
racial biases in the criminal legal system.211
CONCLUSION
The NYPD has developed a new and potentially powerful
predictive tool that will help investigators more efficiently identify
crime patterns. Whether the tool is “fair,” as its developers claim, is
yet to be determined — though unlikely from the information that is
available. Advocates for over-policed communities and those accused
of crimes have reason to be concerned and to remain vigilant. Prior
generations of predictive policing and actuarial justice tools —
including algorithms that do not include race in their design —
produce racially-disparate results that intensify policing of already
over-policed communities. It is likely that Patternizr will produce
similar results due to the over-representation of people of color
presently in NYPD databases.
The combination of racial,
automation, and confirmation biases may produce particularly
devastating results for individuals who appear in Patternizr’s
recommendations. Advocates and policymakers should act quickly to
address the issues arising from Patternizr and other predictive
policing tools. While waiting for policymakers to act to limit its
harms, the city’s criminal defense attorneys will need to serve as a
bulwark against the potential misuse of Patternizr. In a justice system
that relies on quick plea deals, defense attorneys will need to do their
due diligence to ensure that officers and prosecutors are not relying
on computerized matches and scant evidence when charging new
crimes based on past M.O.s that may — or may not — be linked in a
pattern.

210. See supra Section I.B.ii; note 199 and accompanying text.
211. See supra Section I.B.i.

